Introduction
Twist-secure curves for elliptic curve cryptography are much in vogue these days; [1] and others have proposed that twist-security is an essential safety condition for choosing curves.
Relatively few twist-secure curves have been specified of short-Weierstrass form.
[1] cites [5] as introducing the so-called "unsafe-twist" attack, but I have been unable to find any evidence either in that paper or in his (quite excellent) thesis, [4] , that he was aware of the attack. 1 
Elliptic twin curves
We follow the definitions of [7] , with some minor modifications. Let E j be the elliptic curve of invariant j, and E j (F q ) be its reduction over a finite field of characteristic p > 5, n ≥ 1 with p prime. Let and t(E j (F q )) be the trace of Frobenius of that elliptic curve.
Let E j (F q ) be the non-trivial quadratic twist of E j (F q ) over the same field.
An elliptic twin is a pair consisting of a prime p, and a set of two primes not equal to p or 0, {l, r}, such that
It is clear that there exist elliptic twins over arbitrary prime fields, but the formulae of [7] are not amenable to characterizing local fluctuations in the density of such elliptic twins holding the finite field fixed.
Primes
We consider the non-Mersenne SECP primes, standardized for the use of the federal government in [9] , which are, where N := 2 32 :
They are subset of the class of Generalized Mersennes defined by [8] .
In future work, we plan to extend the study to consider the more general question of the distribution of group structure and curve exponent for reductions of curves over fields for which their number of integral points is non-prime, and apply similar techniques with respect to the two curves proposed for IETF use, the nearly-Mersenne M 255 = 2 255 − 19 and the Hamburg-Solinas trinomial H 448 = 2 448 − 2 224 − 1. 2 (We probably won't extend this work to the Mersenne M 521 , as that particular calculation is pestiferously large.)
5 Numerical methods
Finding prime-order curves
A slightly modified version of PARI/GP was used to calculate the traces of prime-order curves, based on code of [HamburgPARI] . (The particular code used for this version of this paper may be found at [6] .) Point-counting was aborted early if #E j was found to have a small prime factor.
Results, initial experiment
We calculate T f (j) for each E j for 0 < j < 2 20 , j = 1728, then test #E j and #E t j (Z q )) for (pseudo-)primality. For this to be a reasonable procedure, it requires the assumption that jinvariant is not correlated with the probability of the curve being an elliptic twin, even on a local scale of 2 20 .
The strictly stronger hypothesis that small values of short-Weierstrassform b, for arbitrary fixed a, are not correlated on this scale with any cryptographically relevant properties of curves is standard, but I am not aware of any evidence for this hypothesis. 
Future work
Because the above method results in fairly low precision in estimating N π ′ /N π because of the small number of doubly-prime curves, we plan to use two slightly different methods, essentially similar to those of [7] . Procedure 1. We generate N random j-invariants, (j 0,0 , . . . , j N,0 ), and increment each by 1 until we find a twin prime curve.
Procedure 2. We generate random j-invariants repeatedly until we collect N prime and N twin prime curves.
The procedure we will use to generate the random j-invariants is, for both procedures, 
Concluding, mostly irrelevant aside
The quantity 1/p(p) = N π (p)/N π ′ (p) is an estimator for the number of trials required, when choosing a prime curve uniformly at random in F q for that curve to be an elliptic twin. The probability, however, that no elliptic curves in a set of N curves are elliptic twins is, of course,
With respect to the curves generated by the NSA for [SECP1], and subsequently standardized by [9] , this calculation gives a probability of very approximately > 95% that none of the curves over P 224 , P 256 , and P 384 would be an elliptic twin.
But the curve over P-384 is an elliptic twin. One might thus conclude that it is more likely than not that the NSA's curves were not generated by a process that samples from a uniform distribution on prime-order curves over the chosen prime fields. 3 In particular, this suggests that the NSA's choice of seeds for the "random" prime curves were subject to additional safety criteria not yet publicly disclosed. (Or, of course, that things with 5% probability aren't terribly rare events... 4 ) In addition, it suggests that the fever for "twist-security" which has taken grip of the cryptographic community is potentially dangerous: These are a smallish class of elliptic curves, and there is no evidence that -provided an implementation is not vulnerable to a small-twist attack -they possess either more or less structure than a non-twist-secure curve.
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Appendix. Cofactors for SafeCurves
This table is adapted (read stolen directly) from [2] . The rows have been sorted by the cofactor of the twist of the curve. The curves for which twistsecurity was a stated security criterion during the selection process have been omitted.
Curve h(E j ) h(E t j (Z q )))
